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Abstract—Phasor measurement units (PMUs) can be effectively
utilized for the monitoring and control of the power grid. As the
cyber-world becomes increasingly embedded into power grids,
the risks of this inevitable evolution become serious. In this paper,
we present a risk mitigation strategy, based on dynamic state
estimation, to eliminate threat levels from the grid’s unknown
inputs and potential cyber-attacks. The strategy requires (a)
the potentially incomplete knowledge of power system models
and parameters and (b) real-time PMU measurements. First,
we utilize a dynamic state estimator for higher order depictions
of power system dynamics for simultaneous state and unknown
inputs estimation. Second, estimates of cyber-attacks are obtained
through an attack detection algorithm. Third, the estimation and
detection components are seamlessly utilized in an optimization
framework to determine the most impacted PMU measurements.
Finally, a risk mitigation strategy is proposed to guarantee the
elimination of threats from attacks, ensuring the observability
of the power system through available, safe measurements. Case
studies are included to validate the proposed approach. Insightful
suggestions, extensions, and open problems are also posed.
Index Terms—Cyber-attacks, cybersecurity, dynamic state es-
timation, phasor measurement units, risk mitigation, unknown
inputs.
ACRONYMS
CA Cyber-attack.
DRMA Dynamic risk mitigation algorithm.
DRMOP Dynamic risk mitigation opt. problem.
DSE Dynamic state estimation.
ILP Integer linear program.
LMI Linear matrix inequality.
PMU Phasor measurement unit.
SMO Sliding mode observer.
UI Unknown input.
WDTL Weighted deterministic threat level.
NOMENCLATURE
x, xˆ States and the estimate.
e State estimation error, i.e., x− xˆ.
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yq, yˆq Measurements and the estimate.
w, wˆ Unknown input vector and its estimate.
vq, vˆq CA vector and its estimate.
l Column vector of the attack detection filter.
r Residual of the attack detection filter.
z WDTL vector.
pi Vector of binary decision variables which
is equal to 1 if the ith PMU measurement
is used for state estimation and 0 otherwise.
λ Vector of eigenvalues of A.
A Linearized system state matrix.
Bw Weight distribution matrix for UIs.
Cq Linearized power system output matrix.
O Observability matrix.
Lq,F q,P Sliding mode observer design matrices.
Y ,Y i Admittance matrix of the reduced network
consisting of generators and its ith row.
ΨR,ΨI Column vector of all generators’ real and
imaginary part of the voltage source on
system reference frame.
αi Cost weight for activating or deactivating
the ith PMU measurement.
βi Weight of the ith PMU measurement.
γi Residual threshold of the ith measurement.
η, ν SMO gain and smoothing constants.
ζ Rank of Bw.
δ Rotor angle in rad.
ω, ω0, ωf Rotor speed, rated rotor speed, and rotor
speed set point in rad/s.
ωe Rotor speed deviation in pu.
Efd, E
0
fd Internal field voltage and its initial value in
pu.
Et Terminal voltage phasor.
E0T Initial machine terminal voltage.
eq, ed Terminal voltage at q axis and d axis in pu.
e′q, e
′
d Transient voltage at q axis and d axis in pu.
eR, eI Real and imaginary part of the terminal
voltage phasor.
exc1,2,3 Internally set exciter constants.
GP Set of generators where PMUs are installed.
H Generator inertia constant in second.
It Terminal current phasor.
iq, id Current at q and d axes in pu.
iR, iI Real and imaginary part of the terminal
current phasor in pu.
KA Voltage regulator gain.
KD Damping factor in pu.
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2KE Exciter constant.
KF Stabilizer gain.
Pe Electric power in pu.
P 0m Initial mechanical input power.
q, ng, nw Number of PMUs, generators, and UIs.
Rf Stabilizing transformer state variable.
SB , SN System base and generator base MVA.
tg1, tg2, tg3 Governor, servo, and reheater variables.
TA, Te, TF Voltage regulator, exciter, and stabilizer
time constants.
Tm, Te Mechanical torque and electric air-gap
torque in pu.
Tmax Maximum power order.
T ′q0, T
′
d0 Open-circuit time constants for q and d axes
in seconds.
Ts, Tc Servo and HP turbine time constants.
T3, T4, T5 Transient gain time constant, time constant
to set HP ratio, and reheater time constant.
VA, VR Regulator output voltage in pu.
VFB Feedback from stabilizing transformer.
VTR Voltage transducer output in pu.
xq, xd Synchronous reactance at q, d axes in pu.
x′q, x
′
d Transient reactance at q, d axes in pu.
1/r Steady state gain.
sgn(·) Signum function.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
CLASSICAL supervisory control and data acquisition(SCADA) systems have become insufficient to guarantee
real-time protection of power systems’ assets. Consequently,
the research and development of wide area measurement
systems (WAMS) have significantly increased. By utilizing
the phasor measurement units (PMUs), WAMS technologies
enable near real-time monitoring of the system, hence em-
powering a more accurate depiction of the power-grid’s cyber-
physical status—and improved grid control.
Recently, the National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Orga-
nization Resource (NESCOR) investigated many cybersecurity
failure scenarios, which are defined as “realistic event in
which the failure to maintain confidentiality, integrity, and/or
availability of sector cyber assets creates a negative impact on
the generation, transmission, and/or delivery of power” [1].
Among these failure scenarios the following two wide-area
monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) scenarios mo-
tivate the research in this paper:
• WAMPAC.4: Measurement Data Compromised due to
PDC1 Authentication Compromise;
• WAMPAC.6: Communications Compromised between
PMUs and Control Center.
Specifically, we consider the problem of attacking PMU mea-
surements by compromising the signals sent to the control
center. The two aforementioned scenarios are related in the
sense that compromising the communication between PMUs,
PDCs, and control center can include alteration of PMU data.
1A single PMU transmits measurements to a phasor data concentrator
(PDC), and then to a super PDC, through a wireless communication network
based on the NASPInet architecture [2].
In addition to that, we assume that the dynamics of a power
system are inherently uncertain.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW & GAPS, PAPER OBJECTIVES
The most widely studied static state estimation (SSE) [3]–
[7] cannot capture the dynamics of power systems well due to
its dependency on slow update rates of SCADA systems. In
contrast, dynamic state estimation (DSE) enabled by PMUs
can provide accurate dynamic states of the system, and
will predictably play a critical role in achieving real-time
wide-area monitoring, protection, and control. DSE has been
implemented by extended Kalman filter [8], [9], unscented
Kalman filter [10]–[13], square-root unscented Kalman filter
[14], extended particle filter [15], and ensemble Kalman filter
[16]. Other dynamical state observers for power systems with
unknown inputs (UI) or under cyber-attacks (CA) have also
been developed, as in [17]–[19].
DSE requires a reliable dynamic model of the power system,
which can be based on post-validation of the dynamic model
and calibration the parameters of generators, as in [20]–[22];
however, there is still a gap between the model and actual
power system physics. Assuming that the dynamical models
are perfectly accurate can generate sub-optimal estimation
laws. In this paper we discuss how this discrepancy can be
systematically addressed by the estimation of UIs.
Detecting and isolating CAs in cyber-physical systems
generally, and smart-grids specifically, has received immense
attention. Liu et al. present a new class of attacks, called
false data injection attacks, targeted against SSE in power
networks [23], and show that an attacker can launch successful
attacks to alter state estimate. In [24], [25], the authors propose
a generic framework for attack detection, metrics on control-
lability and observability, and centralized & distributed attack
detection monitors, for a linear time-invariant representation of
power systems. The reader is referred to [26] for a survey on
different types of CAs and attack detection and identification
methods that are mainly based on control-theoretic foundations
and to [2] for a survey on cyber-security in smart grids.
In [27], a security-oriented cyber-physical state estimation
system is proposed to identify the maliciously modified set
of measurements by a combinatorial-based bad-data detection
method based on power measurements and cyber security state
estimation result. However, this work is still on SSE which is
significantly different from the DSE discussed in this paper.
In [28], Mousavian et al. present a probabilistic risk mit-
igation model for CAs against PMU networks, in which
a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) is formulated
that incorporates the derived threat levels of PMUs into a
risk-mitigation technique. In this MILP, the binary variables
determine whether a certain PMU shall be kept connected to
the PMU network or removed, while minimizing the maxi-
mum threat level for all connected PMUs [28]. However, the
estimation problem with PMUs is not considered—there is no
connection between the real-time states of the power system
and the threat levels. In this paper, we evaluate the measured
and estimated PMU signals, as well as the estimates of UIs and
CAs, as an essential deterministic component in the decision-
3making problem that determines which PMU measurements
should be disconnected from the estimation process.
The objective of this paper is to develop a framework that
(a) leverages PMU data to detect disturbances and attacks
against a power network and (b) enables secure estimation
of power system states, UIs, and CAs. In Section III, we
present the power system model used for DSE. The physical
meaning of the UIs and CAs is discussed in Section IV. The
dynamical models of state-observer is discussed in Section V.
Given a dynamical observer, closed-form estimates for vectors
of UIs and CAs, as well as an attack detection filter are
all discussed in Section VI. Utilizing the aforementioned
estimates, a dynamic risk mitigation algorithm is formulated
in Section VII. Section VIII summarizes the overall solution
scheme. In Section IX, numerical results on the 16-machine
68-bus power system are presented to validate the proposed
risk mitigation approach. Finally closing remarks and open
research problems are discussed in Section X.
III. POWER SYSTEM MODEL
Here, we review the nonlinear dynamics and small-signal
linearized representation of a power system.
A. Nonlinear Dynamics of the Power System
The fast sub-transient dynamics and saturation effects are
ignored and each of the ng generators is described by the
two-axis transient model with an IEEE Type DC1 excitation
system and a simplified turbine-governor system [29]:
δ˙i = ωi − ω0
ω˙i =
ω0
2Hi
(
Tmi − Tei −
KDi
ω0
(ωi − ω0)
)
e˙′qi =
1
T ′d0i
(
Efdi − e′qi − (xdi − x′di)idi
)
e˙′di =
1
T ′q0i
(−e′di + (xqi − x′qi)iqi)
V˙Ri =
1
TAi
(−VRi +KAiVAi)
E˙fdi =
1
Tei
(VRi −KEiEfdi − SEi)
R˙fi =
1
TFi
(−Rfi + Efdi)
t˙g1i =
1
Tsi
(Di − tg1i)
t˙g2i =
1
Tci
((
1− T3i
Tci
)
tg1i − tg2i
)
t˙g3i =
1
T5i
((
T3i
Tci
tg1i + tg2i
)(
1− T4i
T5i
)
− tg3i
)
,
(1)
where i is the generator index. For generator i, the terminal
voltage phasor Eti = eRi + jeIi and the terminal current
phasor Iti = iRi + jiIi can be measured and used as outputs
from actual PMU measurements. The physical meaning of all
the parameters in (1) are included in the nomenclature section.
Remark 1. For the above power system model, we treat the
exciter and governor control system variables as state variables
and thus there are no control inputs in the system model.
The Tmi , Tei , idi , iqi VAi , SEi , and Di in (1) can be written
as functions of the states:
Tmi =
T4i
T5i
(
T3i
Tci
tg1i + tg2i
)
+ tg3i (2a)
ΨRi = e
′
di sin δi + e
′
qi cos δi (2b)
ΨIi = e
′
qi sin δi − e′di cos δi (2c)
Iti = Y i(ΨR + jΨI) (2d)
iRi = Re(Iti) (2e)
iIi = Im(Iti) (2f)
iqi =
SB
SNi
(iIi sin δi + iRi cos δi) (2g)
idi =
SB
SNi
(iRi sin δi − iIi cos δi) (2h)
eqi = e
′
qi − x′diidi (2i)
edi = e
′
di + x
′
qiiqi (2j)
Pei = eqiiqi + ediidi (2k)
Tei =
SB
SNi
Pei (2l)
VFBi =
KFi
TFi
(Efdi −Rfi) (2m)
VTRi =
√
eqi
2 + edi
2 (2n)
VAi = −VFBi − VTRi + exc3i (2o)
SEi = exc
1
i e
exc2i |Efdi |sgn(Efdi) (2p)
ωei =
1
ω0
(ωfi − ωi) (2q)
di = P
0
mi +
1
ri
ωei (2r)
Di =
 0, di ≤ 0di, 0 < di ≤ Tmaxi
Tmaxi , di > T
max
i .
(2s)
The state vector x and output vector y are
x =
[
δ> ω> e′q
>
e′d
>
VR
>Efd>Rf> tg1
> tg2
> tg3
>
]>
y =
[
eR
> eI> iR> iI>
]>
,
and the power system dynamics can be written as:{
x˙(t) = f(x)
y(t) = h(x).
(3)
In (2) the outputs iRi and iIi are written as functions of
x. Similarly, the outputs eRi and eIi can also be written as
functions of x:
eRi = edi sin δi + eqi cos δi (4a)
eIi = eqi sin δi − edi cos δi. (4b)
B. Linearized Power System Model
For a large-scale power system, the nonlinear model can
be difficult to analyze, necessitating a simpler, linear time-
invariant (LTI) representation of the system [30]. The power
system dynamics can be linearized by considering a small
perturbation over an existing equilibrium point. The following
4assumption is needed to construct the small-signal, linearized
model of the nonlinear power system.
Assumption 1. For the nonlinear dynamical system in (1)
there exists an equilibrium point denoted as:
x∗> =
[
δ> ω> e′q
>
e′d
>
VR
>Efd>Rf> tg1
> tg2
> tg3
>
]∗
.
The above assumption is typical in transient analysis studies
for power systems and other engineering applications modeled
by nonlinear DAEs [31]. Denote by x˜ ∈ R10ng the deviations
of the state from the equilibrium point and y˜q ∈ R4q the
deviations of the outputs from the outputs at the equilibrium
point. The small-signal dynamics can be written as:{
˙˜x(t) = Ax˜(t)
y˜q(t) = Cq x˜(t).
(5)
where the system matrix A ∈ R10ng×10ng is defined by the
parameters of the generators, loads, transmission lines, and the
topology of the power network, and Cq ∈ R4q×10ng depends
on the specific PMU placement, where q is the total number
of PMUs with four measurements each. In what follows, we
use the notations x and yq instead of x˜ and y˜q for simplicity.
IV. UNKNOWN INPUTS & ATTACK-THREAT MODEL:
THE PHYSICAL MEANING
Although the modeling of the power system dynamics has
been the subject of extensive research studies, a gap still
exists between our mathematical understanding of the power
system physics and the actual dynamic processes. Therefore,
assuming that the developed dynamical models are perfectly
accurate can generate sub-optimal control or estimation laws.
Consequently, various control and estimation theory studies
have investigated methods that address the aforementioned
discrepancy between the models and the actual physics—for
power systems and other dynamical systems.
Here, we discuss how these discrepancies can be system-
atically incorporated into the power system dynamics and
present physical interpretations of UIs and potential CAs—
exemplifying these discrepancies. In this paper, and by defi-
nition, we consider UIs, denoted by w(t), and CAs, denoted
by vq(t), to be unknown quantities that affect the process
dynamics and PMU output measurements, respectively.
A. Modeling Unknown Inputs
The nominal system dynamics for a controlled power sys-
tem can be given by x˙(t) = f(x,u) = Ax(t) +Buu(t).
Remark 2. For the 10th order power system model the con-
trols, u(t), are incorporated with the power system dynamics
and states—we consider that the controls have a dynamic
model as well. In that case, Bu and u(t) are both zeroes,
unless there are other power system controls to be considered.
Here, we consider the nominal system dynamics to be a
function of w(t), or x˙(t) = f˜(x,u,w). For power systems,
the UIs affecting the system dynamics can include ud (rep-
resenting the unknown plant disturbances), uu (denoting the
unknown control inputs), and ua (depicting potential actuator
faults). For simplicity, we can combine ud,uu,ua into one UI
quantity, w(t), defined as w(t) =
[
u>d (t) u
>
u (t) u
>
a (t)
]> ∈
Rnw , and then write the process dynamics under UIs as
x˙(t) = f˜(x,u,w) = Ax(t) +Buu(t) +Bww(t), (6)
where Bw is a known weight distribution matrix that defines
the distribution of UIs with respect to each state equation x˙i.
For the dynamical system in (1), matrix Bw ∈ R10ng×nw .
The term Bww(t) models a general class of UIs such as
uncertainties related to variable loads, nonlinearities, modeling
uncertainties and unknown parameters, noise, parameter vari-
ations, unmeasurable system inputs, model reduction errors,
and actuator faults [32], [33].
For example, the equation x˙1 = δ˙1 = x2 − ω0 = ω1 − ω0
most likely has no UIs, as there is no modeling uncertainty
related to that process. Also, actuator faults on that equation
are not inconceivable. Hence, the first row of Bw can be
identically zero. Furthermore, if one of the parameters in (1)
are unknown, this unknown parameter can be augmented to
w(t). Furthermore, the unknown inputs we are considering are
influencing all the buses in the power system. Precisely, for any
state-evolution xi(t), we have: x˙i(t) = Aix(t) +Bwiw(t) =
Aix(t) +
∑nw
j=1Bwijwj(t), ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where Ai is
the ith row of the A-matrix and Bi is the ith row of the
Bw-matrix, which entails that each bus can be potentially
influenced by a combination of UIs. Hence, even if we have
so many variations, these variations are causing disturbances
to all the states in the power system.
Remark 3. Note that for a large-scale system it can be a
daunting task to determine Bw. Hence, state estimators should
ideally consider worst case scenarios with UIs, process noise,
and measurement noise. As a result, assuming a random Bw
matrix and then designing an estimator based on that would
consequently lead to a more robust estimator/observer design.
B. Modeling Cyber Attacks
As mentioned in the introduction, NESCOR developed
cyber-security failure scenarios with corresponding impact
analyses [1]. The report classifies potential failure scenarios
into different classes, including wide area monitoring, pro-
tection, and control (WAMPAC)—this paper’s main focus.
Here, and relevant to the physical meaning of CAs (or attack-
vectors), we define vq(t) ∈ R4q as a CA that is a function
of time, used to depict the aforementioned WAMPAC failure
scenarios. Note that many entries in this vector are zero as an
attacker might not have the ability to attack all measurements
simultaneously. Under a wide class of attacks, the output
measurement equation can be written as
yq(t) = Cqx(t) + vq(t). (7)
In this formulation, vq(t) can encapsulate a CA with three
different physical meanings and classes:
1) The first class is the data integrity attacks where an
attacker attempts to change the output measurement of
a sensor; see [34], [35] for recent results on data integrity
attacks in smart grids.
52) The second class is the replay attacks—the attacker
replays a previous snapshot of a valid data packet [36].
3) The third class is the denial of service (DoS) attack—
the attacker introduces a denial in communication of the
measurement. The authors in [37] discuss DoS attacks
on load frequency control in smart grid.
While we define vq(t) in this paper to be a cyber-attack or
attack vector, this definition encapsulate the above classes of
“attacks”. Furthermore, another physical meaning for vq(t) is
bad data. Bad data occurs when (1) a redundant measurement
is erroneous, which can be detected by statistical tests based
on measurement residuals, (2) observations may be corrupted
with abnormally large measurement errors, (3) large unex-
pected meter and communication errors, or (4) malfunctioning
sensors; see [38] for bad data definitions. Hence, bad data can
be different from CAs—CAs attempt to adversely influence
the estimates. However, both (bad data attacks and CAs) can
lead to negative consequences and can share mathematically
equivalent meaning with varying threat levels.
C. Attacker’s Objective
An attacker wants to cause significant changes to the trans-
mitted PMU data. Since this data is bound to be used for real-
time control in smart grids (see U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and NASPI mandates [1], [39], [40]), a change in
these estimates/measurements can cause significant alterations
to the corresponding feedback control signals. In fact, the
executive summary from a recently published U.S. DOE report
highlights the inevitable usability of PMU measurements2.
V. STATE ESTIMATION METHOD UNDER UIS AND CAS
With the integration of PMUs, an observer or a DSE
method can be utilized to estimate the internal state of the
generators. Observers can be viewed as computer programs
running online simulations—they can be easily programmed
and integrated into control centers. Observers differ from KF-
based estimators in the sense that no assumptions are made on
the distribution of measurement and process noise, i.e., statis-
tical information related to noise distribution is not available.
The objective of this section is to investigate a robust observer
for power systems with real-time PMU measurements.
A. Sliding-Mode Observer for Power Systems
A variable structure control or sliding model control is
a nonlinear control method whose structure depends on the
current state of the system. Similar to sliding mode controllers,
sliding mode observers (SMO) are nonlinear observers that
possess the ability to drive the estimation error, the difference
between the actual and estimated states, to zero or to a
bounded neighborhood in finite time. Similar to some Kalman
filter-based methods, SMOs have high resilience to measure-
ment noise. In [41], approaches for effective sliding mode
2From a DOE report: The Western Electricity Coordinating Council has
determined that it can increase the energy flow along the California-Oregon
Intertie by 100 MW or more using synchrophasor data for real-time control—
reducing energy costs by an estimated $35 million to $75 million over 40 years
without any new high-voltage capital investments [39].
control in electro-mechanical systems are discussed. Here we
present a succinct representation of the SMO architecture
developed in [42]. For simplicity, we use x as the state vector
of the linearized power system, rather than x˜ and y as the
outputs from PMUs, rather than y˜. As discussed in previous
sections, the linearized power system dynamics under UIs and
CAs can be written as{
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bww(t)
yq(t) = Cqx(t) + vq(t),
(8)
where for the system described in (3) there are 10ng states,
nw unknown plant inputs, and 4 q measurements.
Assumption 2. The above dynamical system is said to be
observable if the observability matrix O, defined as O =[
C>q (CqA)
> · · · (CqA10ng−1)>
]>
has full rank. The full-
rank condition on the system implies that a matrix Lq ∈
R10ng×4q can be found such that matrix (A − LqCq) is
asymptotically stable with eigenvalues having strictly negative
real parts. While this assumption might be very restrictive,
it is not a necessary condition for the estimator we discuss
next. This assumption is relaxed to the detectability of the pair
(A,Cq). The power system is detectable if all the unstable
modes are observable—verified via the PBH test:
rank
[
λiI −A
Cq
]
= 10ng, ∀λi > 0,
where λi belongs to set of eigenvalues of A. Also, we
the observer rank-matching condition is satisfied, that is:
rank(CqBw) = rank(Bw) = ζ.
The objective of an observer design is to drive the estimation
error to zero within a reasonable amount of time. Accurate
state estimates can be utilized to design local or global state
feedback control laws, steering the system response towards
a desirable behavior. Let xˆ(t) and e(t) = x(t)− xˆ(t) denote
the estimated states and the estimation error.
B. SMO Dynamics & Design Algorithm
The SMO for the linearized power system dynamics (8) can
be written as{
˙ˆx(t) = Axˆ(t) +Lq(yq(t)−yˆq(t))−BwE(yˆq,yq, η)
yˆq(t) = Cqxˆ(t),
(9)
where yq is readily available signals for the observer, and E(·)
is defined as
E(·) =
η
F q(yˆq − yq)
‖F q(yˆq − yq)‖2 + ν
if F q(yˆq − yq) 6= 0
0 if F q(yˆq − yq) = 0,
where:
• η > 1 is the SMO gain and ν is a smoothing parameter
(small positive number),
• F q ∈ Rnw×4q satisfies the following matrix equality
F qCq = B
>
wP ,
6• Lq ∈ R10ng×4q is chosen to guarantee the asymptotic
stability of A−LqCq .
Hence, for any positive definite symmetric matrix Q, there is
a unique symmetric positive definite matrix P ∈ R10ng×10ng
such that P satisfies the Lyapunov matrix equation,
(A−LqCq)>P + P (A−LqCq) = −Q, P = P>  0.
The nonlinear vector function, E(·), guarantees that the esti-
mation error is insensitive to the UI w(t) and the estimation
error converges asymptotically to zero. If for the chosen Q,
no matrix F q satisfies the above equality, another matrix Q
can be chosen. Note that the SMO can deal with a wide
range of unknown parameters and inputs (affecting states
evolution), yet it cannot tolerate a severe CA against the
PMU measurements. In this paper, the framework we develop
addresses this limitation through the dynamic risk mitigation
algorithm that utilizes CAs estimation and a detection filter
(Sections VI and VII).
A design algorithm for the aforementioned SMO can be
found in [42], which presents a systematic way of obtain-
ing the gain matrices for reduced-order observers. Here, we
present a simple solution to the observer design problem.
The above boxed equations are the main matrix-equalities
needed to solve for the observer matrices F q,P , and Lq—
guaranteeing the asymptotic stability of the estimation error,
and the convergence of the state-estimates to actual ones.
However, these equalities are bi-linear matrix equalities, due
to the presence of the PLqCq term in the Lyapunov matrix
equation. Using the LMI trick by setting Y = PLq , we can
rewrite the above system of linear matrix equations as:
A>P + PA−C>q Y > − Y Cq = −Q
P = P> (10)
F qCq = B
>
wP .
After obtaining P ,F q,Y , and computing3 Lq = P−1Y ,
the SMO can be implemented via a numerical simulation.
The above system of equations can be easily solved via
any semidefinite program solvers such as CVX [43], [44],
YALMIP [45], or MATLAB’s LMI solver.
VI. ASYMPTOTIC RECONSTRUCTION OF UIS & CAS
In last section, we introduce real-time observers for a power
system. Here, we present estimation methods for the vectors
of UIs, w(t), and potential attacks, vq(t). To our knowledge,
this approach has never been utilized in power systems with
observers. This approach we discuss here, however, does not
provide strict guarantees on the convergence of the estimates
of these quantities, yet it is significant in the developed risk
mitigation strategy. To guarantee the detection of CAs and
compromised PMU measurements, we also discuss an attack
detection algorithm with performance guarantees.
3The computation of these matrices is performed offline, i.e., the observer
is designed apriori. In Section IX, we present the number of free and linear
variables, as well as the offline running time of the observer design problem
for the considered power system.
A. Estimating Unknown Inputs
As discussed earlier, the designed SMO guarantees the
asymptotic convergence of the state estimates to the actual
ones. Substituting the differential equations governing the
dynamics of the power system (8) and the SMO (9) into the
estimation error dynamics, we obtain
e˙(t) = x˙(t)− ˙ˆx(t) (11)
= (A−LqCq) (x(t)− xˆ(t)) +Bww(t)
−BwE(yˆq,yq, η)
= (A−LqCq) e(t) +Bww(t)−BwE(e, η). (12)
This SMO is designed to guarantee that xˆ(t) is the asymptotic
estimate of x(t). Since it is assumed that Bw is a full-rank
matrix, the following UI approximation holds:
wˆ(t) ≈ E(yˆq(t),yq(t), η). (13)
The above estimates, as reported in [46], requires further low-
pass filtering which can be very heuristic. Here, we suggest
an alternative to the UI estimation assuming that the state
estimates converge to the actual ones asymptotically.
First, we write the discretized version of the power system
dynamics:
x(k + 1) = A˜x(k) + B˜uu(k) + B˜ww(k),
where A˜ = eAh, B˜u =
∫ h
0
eAτBu dτ , and B˜w =∫ h
0
eAτBw dτ are the discrete version of the state-space matri-
ces. Since the observer design guarantees the convergence of
the state estimates, xˆ(t) or xˆ(k), and xˆ(k) is available for all
k, then the vector of UI w(k) can be approximated as follows.
Substituting x(k) by xˆ(k) in the discretized dynamics of the
power system, we obtain:
xˆ(k + 1) = A˜xˆ(k) + B˜uu(k) + B˜wwˆ(k).
Then, another estimate for the UI vector can be generated as:
wˆ(k) =
(
B˜w
)† (
xˆ(k + 1)− A˜xˆ(k)− B˜uu(k)
)
, (14)
assuming that B˜w has full column rank and its left pseudo-
inverse exists. Note that this estimation of the UI vector uses
the generated estimates of one subsequent time period (xˆ(k+
1)) and the actual control (if the latter exists in the model).
This assumption is not restricting as observers/estimators are
computer programs that run in parallel with the plants or
dynamic processes.
B. Estimating CAs
Attacks against synchrophasor measurements can be mod-
eled in various scenarios. One possible scenario is the injection
of malicious signals that alter the values of the measurements
in the data packets sent from PMUs to PDCs and control
centers, in addition to PMUs malfunctions. As in (8), a real-
time CA vq(t) is included to alter the PMU measurements.
The objective of this section is to apply an attack detection
technique based on the estimation of CAs. Assuming an
identical SMO architecture as the one presented in the previous
7section, an estimate of the CA, vˆq(t), is derived in [46] and
its dynamics takes the following form:
vˆq(t) = −(F qCqLq)†(F qCqBw)(E¯(t)− wˆ(t)) (15)
+(F qCqLq)
†F q ˙ˆvq(t),
where wˆ(t) is given in (13), F q and Lq are SMO design
parameters, E¯(t) is selected such that the system is in sliding
mode along FCqe(t) = 0. In [46], the authors assume that
˙ˆvq(t) ≈ 0, which might not be a reasonable assumption in our
application since an CA can be designed such that v˙q(t) 6= 0.
Rearranging (15), we obtain
˙ˆvq(t) = V
−1
1 vˆq(t) + V
−1
1 V 2m(t), (16)
where
V 1 = (F qCqLq)
†F q ∈ R4q×4q, m(t) =
[
wˆ>(t) E¯>(t)
]>
V 2 =
[
(F qCqLq)
†(F qCqBw) −(F qCqLq)†(F qCqBw)
]
∈ R4q×(nw+10ng).
Note that V 1 is invertible. A more accurate estimate for the
CA can further be obtained as
vˆq(t) = e
V −11 (t−t0)vˆq(t0) +
∫ t
t0
eV
−1
1 (t−ϕ)V −11 V 2m(ϕ) dϕ.
C. Attack Detection Filter
While the CA estimates generated from the methods dis-
cussed above can instantly identify compromised measure-
ments for few time instances after the detection, the attack can
propagate and influence the estimation of other measurements.
In the case of lower sampling rates or computational power,
another attack detector can be used. In [25], a robust attack
identification filter is proposed to detect the compromised
nodes for longer time periods. We tailor this filter to our
dynamical representation of the power system, which is also
a dynamical system and takes the following form:{
l˙(t) = (A+AC>q Cq)l(t) +AC
>
q yq(t)
r(t) = yq(t)−Cql(t),
(17)
where l(t) ∈ R10ng is the state of the filter and r(t) ∈
R4q is the residual vector that determines the compromised
measurements—the reader is referred to [25] for more details
on the filter design. The initial state of the filter, l(t0), is by
definition equal to the initial state of the plant x(t0). Since
initial conditions might not be available, the SMO discussed
in Section V-A is utilized to generate x(t0) ≈ xˆ(t0). Hence,
the SMO is necessary for the detection of the attack, i.e., we
assume that the SMO is utilized for an initial period of time
when measurements are not compromised.
After generating the converging estimates of the states and
UIs, the filter (17) generates real-time residuals r(t). These
residuals are then compared with a threshold to determine the
most infected/attacked nodes. The residuals here are analogous
to the estimates of the CAs, vˆq(t), which we derive in the pre-
vious section. It is significantly crucial for the attack detection
filter and the CA estimators to obtain online computations of
the residuals and estimates—the attacked measurements might
adversely influence the estimation as the attacks can propagate
in many networks.
The risk mitigation algorithm we develop in the next section
utilizes r(t), vˆq(t), and wˆ(t) to determine the authenticity of
PMU measurements, and identify the to-be-diagnosed mea-
surements, while guaranteeing the observability of the power
system through available measurements.
VII. RISK MITIGATION—A DYNAMIC RESPONSE MODEL
Here, we formulate a risk mitigation strategy given estimates
of measured and estimated outputs and reconstructed UIs
and CAs. The formulation uniquely integrates dynamic state
estimation, considering attacks and UIs, with a integer linear
programming formulation.
A. Weighted Deterministic Threat Level Formulation
We consider the measured and estimated PMU signals as
an essential deterministic component in the decision making
problem that decides which PMUs should be disconnected
from the network for a period of time, while performing
typical troubleshooting and diagnosis.
Definition 1. Given a dynamic system simulation for τ ∈
[kT, (k + 1)T ], where T is any simulation time period, the
weighted deterministic threat level (WDTL) vector z for all
PMU measurements is defined as
z =
∫ (k+1)T
kT
[
Y
(
yq(τ)− yˆq(τ)
)2
+W
(
wˆ(τ)
)2 ]
dτ, (18)
where Y ∈ R4q×4q and W ∈ R4q×nw are constant weight
matrices that assign weights for the estimation error (yq− yˆq)
and UI approximation wˆ. Note that
(
wˆ(τ)
)2
is equivalent to
the square of individual entries.
The scalar quantity zi, the ith WDTL, depicts the threat
level present in the ith PMU signal. Ideally, if zi is large the
associated PMU must be isolated until the attack is physically
mitigated. The quantity
(
yq(τ)− yˆq(τ)
)
can be replaced with
either vˆq(t) or r(t).
B. Dynamic Risk Mitigation Optimization Problem
Deactivating a PMU may lead to a failure in dynamic state
estimation, as explained in the following Remark 4. Hence,
an optimization-based framework is proposed to solve the
problem with occasionally conflicting objectives.
Remark 4. Recall that to design a dynamic state estimator
under UIs and CAs, the power system defined in (8) should
satisfy certain rank conditions on the state-space matrices. For
example, for the SMO observer, the following condition has
to be satisfied:
rank(CqBw) = rank(Bw) = ζ,
in addition to the detectability condition (Assumption 2).
Deactivating a PMU causes a change in the Cq matrix and
might render the observer design infeasible.
8Definition 2. Let pii be a binary decision variable that deter-
mines the connectivity of the ith PMU measurement in the
next time period (i.e., τ ∈ [kT, (k + 1)T ]):
pii =
{
0 ↔ zi − γi ≥ 0
1 ↔ zi − γi < 0.
If the WDTL for the ith measurement is smaller than a
certain threshold γi, the corresponding measurement qualifies
to stay activated in the subsequent time period. This combi-
natorial condition can be represented as
zi − γi + piiM ≥ 0 (19)
zi − γi − (1− pii)M < 0 (20)
where M is a large positive constant [47]. We now formulate
the dynamic risk mitigation optimization problem (DRMOP):
maximize
pi
4q∑
i=1
αipii (21)
subject to pii = {0, 1},∀i = {1, 2, . . . 4q} (22)
zi − γi + piiM ≥ 0 (23)
zi − γi − (1− pii)M < 0 (24)
4q∑
i=1
βipii ≤ Z (25)
rank(Cq(pi)Bw) = ζ (26)
rank
[
λiI −A
Cq(pi)
]
= 10ng,∀λi > 0.(27)
To increase the observability of a power system, the formulated
optimization problem—an integer linear program (ILP)—
maximizes the weighted number of active PMU measurements
in the next time period, finding the PMU measurements that
have to be disabled for some period of time while ensuring
the feasibility of dynamic state estimation. Albeit there are at
most q PMUs, we assume that there are 4 q pii’s.
The first two constraints depict the logical representation
of the binary variable pii in terms of the WDTL and the
threshold. The third constraint represents a weight for each
PMU. For example, if the ith PMU measurement is from
a significantly important substation, the system operator can
choose the corresponding weight βi to be greater than other
weights. The two rank constraints (26)–(27) ensure that the
dynamic state estimation formulated in the previous section
is still feasible for the next time period; see Assumption 2.
Note that this problem is different from the optimal PMU
placement problem [48], [49], in the sense that we already
know the location of the PMUs. The DRMOP (21)–(27) is a
highly nonlinear, integer programming problem that cannot be
solved efficiently—due to the two rank constraints. In the next
section (Section VII-C), we present a dynamic risk mitigation
solution algorithm by relaxing these assumptions.
C. Dynamic Risk Mitigation Algorithm
In Sections VII-A and VII-B, we investigate two related
problems for different time-scales: the estimation problem is
executed in real time, whereas the DRMOP is solved after
generating the estimates in the former problem. Here, we
present an algorithm that jointly integrates these two problems,
without including the rank constraints in the computation of
the DRMOP solution, and hence guaranteeing fast solutions
for the optimization problem.
Algorithm 1 Dynamic Risk Mitigation Algorithm (DRMA)
1: compute small-signal system matrices A,Bw,Cq
2: obtain SMO matrices Lq,F q by solving (10)
3: formulate the SMO dynamics as in (9)
4: set k := 0
5: for τ ∈ [kT + ξ, (k + 1)T ]
6: measure the PMU output y(τ)
7: compute r(τ), yˆq(τ), wˆ(τ) from (17), (9), (14)
8: compute WDTL z from (18), given Y ,U
9: solve the DRMOP (21)–(25) for pi =
[
pi1, · · · , pi4q
]
10: update Cq = Cq(pi)
11: if (26) and (27) are satisfied
12: go to Step 17
13: else
14: solve the DRMOP (21)–(25) with relaxed conditions on
some pii’s and update Cq
15: end if
16: end for
17: set k := k + 1; go to Step 5
Algorithm 1 illustrates the proposed dynamic risk mitigation
algorithm. First, the small-signal matrices are computed given
the nonlinear power system model4. The sliding-mode ob-
server is then designed to ensure accurate state estimation, as
in Section V-A. Since the rank-constraints are computationally
challenging to be included in an integer linear programming,
Algorithm 1 provides a solution to this constraint.
Then, for τ ∈ [kT + ξ, (k + 1)T ], the quantities r, yˆq , and
wˆ are all computed. We assume that the computational time
to solve the DRMOP (21)–(25) is ξ. After solving the ILP,
the output matrix Cq is updated, depending on the solution
of the optimization problem, as the entries in the Cq reflect
the location of active and inactive PMUs. The matrix update
might render the state estimation problem for τ ∈ [(k+1)T +
ξ, (k + 2)T ] infeasible as the rank conditions might not be
satisfied. To ensure that, these conditions can either be made
a constraint in the optimization problem or a condition in the
mitigation algorithm. If this rank conditions are not satisfied,
some pii’s can be reset and the DRMOP can be solved again.
The counter k is then incremented and the algorithm is applied
for the following time periods.
Remark 5. For the developed algorithm, we assume that
we are applying the observer from [17] to generate dynamic
estimates, given that the power system is subjected to UIs
and CAs. However, This assumption is not restricting. In
fact, any other robust observer/estimator may be used for
state estimation, and hence, the algorithm can be changed to
reflect that update in the observer design. Subsequently, the
matching rank condition can be replaced by other conditions
that guarantee a fast reconstruction of state estimates.
4Note that for the 10th order model, the controls are incorporated in the
power system dynamics, and hence Bu and u(t) are zeros, yet the algorithm
provided here is for the case when known controls are considered.
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Fig. 1. A flow chart depicting a high-level representation of the proposed risk mitigation strategy; see Section VIII.
Remark 6. The DRMOP assumes an initial power system
configuration, i.e., PMUs are placed in certain locations.
Since the Cq reflects the latter, the observer design would
differ for various configurations of PMUs. This influences
the state and UI estimation, and hence the generation of the
real-time weighted deterministic threat levels for all PMUs.
Thus, the solution to the DRMOP varies for different PMU
configurations, while guaranteeing the real-time observability
of the power system through available measurements.
VIII. HIGH-LEVEL SOLUTION SCHEME FOR THE RISK
MITIGATION STRATEGY—A SUMMARY
This section serves as a summary of the overall solution
scheme we develop in this paper. The high-level details of this
scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1. The presented solution scheme
requires two essential inputs:
(a) The potentially-incomplete knowledge of the power sys-
tem model and parameters (Section III);
(b) Real-time PMU measurements from a subset of the
power network model (Section III).
Note that (a) and (b) are related in the sense that if the knowl-
edge of a generator’s parameters is available, it is possible to
associate this knowledge to specific PMU measurements.
Given these two inputs—(a) is static knowledge, while (b)
is continuously updated—we construct a real-time depiction
of the nominal system, i.e., the power system experiencing
no CAs or major disturbances. This step is important as it
verifies PMU measurements and the system model. Using the
latter and real-time PMU data, we estimate unknown power
system parameters and UIs (Section VI). Given that we have
more accurate parameters, the detection of malfunctions, CAs,
and major disturbances becomes possible; see Fig. 1.
However, the detection of a CA does not necessarily
imply the knowledge of the source of attacks. Hence, the
identification of PMU channels with faulty measurements
is needed after the detection of such events (Section VII).
The faulty or attacked power system components are then
diagnosed and reconfigured. The reconfiguration/diagnostics
of the grid should, however, guarantee the observability of the
grid (Section VII-C). After guaranteeing the latter, the power
system is brought back to its initial nominal state.
IX. CASE STUDIES
The developed methods are tested on a 16-machine, 68-
bus system—extracted from Power System Toolbox (PST)
[50]. This system is a reduced order, equivalent version of
the interconnected New England test system and New York
power system [51]. The model discussed in Section III is
used and there are 160 state variables. A total of q = 12
PMUs are installed at the terminal bus of generators 1, 3, 4,
5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, and 16. Here this PMU placement
is randomly chosen, while installing the PMUs at optimal
locations to guarantee the best observability of the system
dynamic sates is out of the scope of this paper. More details
for that problem can be found in [48], [49]. The sampling
rate of the measurements is set to be 60 frames per second to
mimic the PMU sampling rate.
In the rest of this section, we present results for two
scenarios. For Scenario I, dynamic state estimation only under
UIs is performed and an illustration on the estimation of UIs
and states via the methods discussed in Section VI is provided.
For Scenario II, we add CAs to some PMU measurements and
show how the DRMOP can be utilized to estimate, detect,
and filter out the presence of these attacks by leveraging the
generated estimates from Scenario I.
A. Scenario I: Dynamic Reconstruction of UI & DSE
The objective of this section is to show the performance
of the SMO in Section V-A in regards to the estimation of
(a) the states of the 16 generators (160 states) and (b) UI
reconstruction method (developed in Section VI). We perform
dynamic state estimation over a time period of 20 seconds.
We consider this experiment as a baseline for the Scenario
II. The simultaneous estimation of states and UIs can be then
utilized to determine the generators that are subject to the most
disturbances through available PMU measurements. After the
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estimation of states and UIs, these quantities are then used to
detect a CA against PMU measurements.
Arbitrary Unknown Inputs As discussed in Section IV,
the UIs model a wide range of process uncertainties ranging
from load deviations, bounded nonlinearities, and unmodeled
dynamics, which can significantly influence the evolution of
states due to their nature. However, UIs are not physically
analogous to malicious CAs, i.e., UIs exist due to phenomena
related to the physics of the power system modeling.
For many dynamical systems, it can be hard to determine
the impact of UIs. Hence, an ideal scenario would be to use
different forms of time-varying UI functions, and a randomly
generated Bw matrix with significant magnitude. Here, we
consider that the power system is subject to six different UI
functions with different variations, magnitudes, and frequen-
cies. The considered vector of UIs is as follows:
w(t) =

w1(t) = k1
(
cos(ψ1t) + e
−2t +max
(
0, 1− |t−5|
3
))
w2(t) = k1 sin(ψ1t)
w3(t) = k1 cos(ψ1t)
w4(t) = k2 square(ψ2t)
w5(t) = k2 sawtooth(ψ2t)
w6(t) = k2
(
sin(ψ2t) + e
−5t)
 ,
where k1, k2 and ψ1, ψ2 denote different magnitudes and
frequencies of the UI signals, respectively. We choose ψ1 =
5, ψ2 = 10. To test the developed SMO and the UI estimator,
we use small and large values for k1 and k2. Specifically, we
choose two set of values for the magnitude as k1 = 0.01, k2 =
0.02 and k1 = 1, k2 = 2.
The Bw ∈ R160×6 matrix is randomly chosen using the
randn function in MATLAB. The Euclidean norm of Bw
is ‖Bw‖ = 13.8857 which is significant in magnitude.
Consequently, since Bw is not sparse, the six chosen UIs
influence the dynamics of the 160 states of the power system,
i.e., x˙1(t) = a1x(t) +
∑6
i=1Bw1,iwi(t), where a1 is the first
row of the A matrix. The above UI setup is used in this
experiment as an extreme scenario, as this allows to test the
robustness of the estimator we develop in this paper.
Remark 7. Using large magnitudes for the UIs (i.e., large k1
and k2) leads to unrealistic behavior of the power system as
each differential equation is adversely influenced by an un-
known, exogenous quantity as described above. This scenario
is less likely to occur in real applications, yet the result is
included to show the robustness of the simultaneous estimation
of the states and the proposed UI estimation scheme.
SMO Design After computing the linearized state-space
matrices for the system (A and Cq) and given Bw, we solve
the LMIs in (10) using CVX [43] on Matlab. The SMO
parameters are η = 8 and ν = 0.01. The numbers of linear
and free variables involved in the semidefinite programming
are 25760 and 79685 with 13840 constraints. The number of
variables can be computed by counting the number of unique
entries of the LMI in (10).
5The number of linear and free variables in (10) is equal to the number of
entries of the symmetric positive definite matrix P (linear vars.), and Lq ,F q .
Since P ∈ R10ng×10ng and ng = 16, the number of linear variables is
(160 + 1)(160) = 25760, while the number of free variables is equal to
nw · 4 q + 10ng · 4 q = 6 · 48 + 160 · 48 = 7968.
The solution to this optimization problem is done offline,
as most observer gain matrices are computed before the actual
dynamic simulation. The simulations are performed on a 64-
bit operating system, with Intel Core i7-4770S CPU 3.10GHz,
equipped with 8 GB of RAM. The execution time for the
offline SMO design (10) is 5 minutes and 39 seconds (CVX
converges after 42 iterations); see Remark 8 for a discussion
on the running time of the offline SMO after the detection
of attacks. The dynamic simulations for the power system and
the observer dynamics are performed simultaneously using the
ode15s solver with a computational time of nearly 6 seconds.
State & UI Reconstruction After finding a solution
for (10), we simulate the power system and generate estimates
of the states x(t) and the UIs w(t) via the SMO design (9)
and UI estimate (14). In Fig. 2 we show the norm of the state
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Fig. 2. Norm of the state estimation error for different magnitudes of UIs.
A logarithmic scale is used for y-axis, as initial values for ‖ex(t)‖2 are
much higher than subsequent ones. For larger magnitudes of UIs, the norm
converges to a larger value, albeit it is still very small.
estimation error for the above two sets of values of k’s. The
estimation error norm is ‖ex(t)‖2 = ‖x(t) − xˆ(t)‖2, ∀ t ∈
[0, T ], which indicates the performance of the SMO for all
time instants and all generators. It is clearly seen that the
estimation error converges to nearly zero—even for high
magnitudes of UIs. This demonstrates that the state estimates
for all generators are converging to the actual states of the
power system. Moreover, Fig. 3 shows the estimation of the six
UIs given above with k1 = 1, k2 = 2. While the six UIs vary
in terms of magnitude, frequency, and shape, the estimates
generated by (14) are all very close to the actual UIs.
B. Scenario II: DSE Under UIs & CAs
Here we present the case when some PMU measurements
are compromised by a CA. The attacker’s objective is to
drastically alter the PMU measurements, thus influencing the
decisions that could be made by the system operator. First,
we discuss the attacker’s strategy, i.e., what attack-signals
are manipulating the measurements. Second, we present an
algorithm that detects the presence of a CA and identifies
the attacked measurement(s). Third, given the estimates of
the attacks and state- and UI-estimation results, we apply
the DRMOP and the DRMA. Finally, we show the impact
of applying risk mitigation strategy on state estimation.
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Fig. 3. Converging estimation for the 6 UIs discussed above. The UI estimator
successfully tracks the UIs for k1 = 1, k2 = 2 for different shapes of the
UIs. The results for the UI reconstruction for k1 = 0.01, k2 = 0.02 are
omitted; however, the results are similar to the case we present in this figure.
Artificial Cyber-Attacks We present a hypothetical CA
vector on four PMU measurements, which are the fifth to
eighth measurements, i.e.,
[
eR6(t) eR8(t) eR9(t) eR10(t)
]>
.
Note that these four measurements come from the PMUs
installed at the terminal bus of Generators 6, 8, 9, and 10,
respectively. Although we denote manipulation of some signals
an attack, this nomenclature is not restrictive; see Section IV
and the NASPI report on faulty PMU measurements [40].
Since a total of 4 q = 48 measurements are available, the CA
vq(t) ∈ R48 can be constructed in terms of different unknown
signal structures, as follows:
vq(t) =
[
04 cos(t) 2 sawtooth(t) 3 square(t) 4 sin(t) 040
]>
,
where the cosine, sawtooth, square, and sine signals are
the actual attacks against the four PMU measurements with
different magnitudes and variations.
Attack Identification & Residual Computation Under the
same UIs from Scenario I, a CA is artificially added after
t = 20s. Fig. 4 shows the generation of residual vector, r(t),
from (17). It is seen that the residuals of measurements 5–8
with artificially added CAs are significantly higher than the
other measurements without CAs.
Dynamic Risk Mitigation Algorithm After designing the
SMO for the power system, achieving desirable state and
UI estimates (Scenario I), and generating residuals that are
estimates of CAs, we simulate the DRMOP. We assume
that all PMU measurements have the same weight in the
objective function, i.e., αi = 1, ∀i = 1, . . . , 48. The WDTL
vector z is computed for the 1-second time horizon (for
t = [20, 21]), and generic threshold is chosen as γ = 10.
Given z(t) and the parameters of the DRMOP, the ILP is
solved via YALMIP [45]. The optimal solution for the ILP
yields pi =
[
14 04 144
]>
, hence the PMU measurements 5–8
are the most infected among the available 48 ones. This result
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These plots are for the residuals for the other 44 measurements,
all much smaller than the residuals for the attacked signals.
Fig. 4. Residuals of the 48 measurements generated by the attack detection
filter (17). The residuals are notably similar to the actual attacks. For example,
for t = 20.05s, r7(t) = 2.986, while v7(t) = 3 square(t) = 3.
confirms the findings of the attack detection filter in Fig. 4.
Following Algorithm 1, we check whether the solution gen-
erated by YALMIP violates the rank condition (Assumption 2).
As measurements 5–8 are removed from the estimation process
for diagnosis, the updated Cq matrix, now a function of pi,
is obtained—Cq now has 44 rows instead of 48. The system
is detectable and the rank-matching condition is still satisfied.
Hence, no extra constraints should be reimposed on the ILP,
as illustrated in Algorithm 1. After guaranteeing the necessary
conditions on the existence of the dynamic state estimator, and
updating Cq , simulations are performed again to regenerate
the state estimates and weighted residual threat levels.
Post-Risk Mitigation Fig. 5 illustrates the impact of CAs
on the state estimation process before, during, and after the
attack is detected and isolated. Following the removal of the
attacked measurements (and not the attack, as the attack cannot
be physically controlled) at t = 21s due to the risk mitigation
strategy, the estimation error norm converges again to small
values. Fig. 6 shows the impact of this strategy on DSE
for Generator 1. During the short-lived CA, state estimates
diverge. However, the risk mitigation strategy restores the
estimates to their nominal status under UIs and CAs6.
Remark 8. The DRMA requires the redesign of the SMO
immediately after the detection of the compromised PMU
measurements. Since Cq has less rows as the number of
measurements are supposedly reduced after some of them are
isolated, the SMO is designed again for an updated observer
gain matrices Lq and F q . For a large scale system, the solution
of the LMI in (10) can take a significant amount of time.
Hence, a database of the most possible PMU measurement
configurations (different Cq’s) with corresponding SMO LMI
solutions (different Lq’s and F q’s) can be obtained offline,
and stored when needed to guarantee a minimal off-time.
Note that for a different time period, the power system
6While the CAs are still targeting the four PMU measurements after t =
21s, the attacks become futile. Consequently, their impact on state estimation
becomes nonexistent, as the four attacked measurements are isolated from the
estimation process.
12
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
102
104
Time (second)
‖e
x
(t
)
=
x
(t
)
−
xˆ
(t
)‖
Fig. 5. Norm of estimation error before, during, and after the CA is detected
and isolated. For 20 s ≤ t ≤ 21 s, the norm increases exponentially, signifying
the occurrence of an attack or a significant disturbance. After the removal of
the artificial attack due to the outcome of the DRMOP, the estimation error
norm converges again to small values.
Time (second)
15 17.5 20 22.5 25
δ
1
(t
)
-1
0
1
Actual
Estimated
Time (second)
15 17.5 20 22.5 25
ω
1
(t
)
370
375
380
Time (second)
15 17.5 20 22.5 25
e
′ q 1
(t
)
0
1
2
Time (second)
15 17.5 20 22.5 25
e
′ d
1
(t
)
-1
0
1
Time (second)
15 17.5 20 22.5 25
V
R
1
(t
)
-20
-10
0
10
Time (second)
15 17.5 20 22.5 25
E
f
d
1
(t
)
-20
-10
0
10
Time (second)
15 17.5 20 22.5 25
R
f
1
(t
)
-20
0
20
Time (second)
15 17.5 20 22.5 25
t g
1 1
(t
)
0
1
2
Time (second)
15 17.5 20 22.5 25
t g
2 1
(t
)
-1
0
1
Time (second)
15 17.5 20 22.5 25
t g
3 1
(t
)
-1
0
1
Fig. 6. Estimation of the states of Generator 1 before, during, and after the
detection and isolation of the CA. After the DRMA succeeds in detecting the
compromised measurements and isolating them from the estimation process
after t = 21s, the state estimates converge again to the actual ones.
and the PMUs might encounter a different set of UIs or
attack-vectors. Furthermore, the optimization problem can be
redesigned to allow for the inclusion of the possibly, now-safe
measurements. The optimal solution to the DRMOP is a trade-
off between keeping the power system observable through the
possible measurements—enabling state estimation and real-
time monitoring—and guaranteeing that the system and the
observer are robust to UIs and CAs.
C. Impact on Post-Estimation Process
In power networks, many substations are not equipped with
PMU devices. Hence, a robust DSE routine—that leverages
measurements from neighboring nodes in a network—is neces-
sary in generating state-estimates for the nodes without PMUs.
As discussed earlier, a major purpose behind DSE is to use
estimation of unknown, unmeasurable quantities for improved
feedback control. In many cases, the estimates are used for
control; in other cases, they are used for real-time depictions
only. Here we discuss how erroneous, attacked state-estimation
can influence power system stability if these estimates are used
for control or re-dispatch purposes, such as the example given
in Section IV from the DOE report [39].
Since significant frequency deviations are remediated by
corrective actions through feedback, e.g., re-dispatch or AGC-
like control strategies, misleading values for a generator’s fre-
quency deviations can lead to erroneous control actions. Fig. 7
shows the frequencies of Generators 12–16, before, during,
and after a CA, depicting the impact that the DRMOP has on
the estimation of frequency deviations given UIs. As illustrated
in Fig. 7, without near-immediate identification and detection
of attacked measurements, wrong corrective actions might be
taken. This can steer the system to instability, while the system
is in reality not experiencing high frequency deviations; rather,
it is experiencing a CA against measurements.
From Fig. 7, and prior to a CA, the frequencies are 60
Hz (377 rad/sec). During a CA, the estimated frequencies of
the five generators indicate serious system instability, which
could be wrongly mitigated by feedback control actions. As
discussed in the previous section, the DRMOP succeeds in
identifying the wrong measurements, and the frequencies are
stable again—indicating a normal grid-condition. Note that the
fluctuations are due to the unknown input vector w(t).
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Time (second)
360
365
370
375
380
385
390
395
G
en
er
a
to
rs
1
2
−
1
6
F
re
q
u
en
ci
es
(r
a
d
/
se
c) ω12(t)
ω13(t)
ω14(t)
ω15(t)
ω16(t)
Fig. 7. Estimated frequencies of the Generators 12–16 before, during, and
after a CA. The figure illustrates the impact that the DRMOP has on the
estimation of frequencies of generators in a power network.
X. CLOSING REMARKS & FUTURE WORK
PMUs can be utilized for ameliorated monitoring and
control of the smart grid. The humongous size of data gen-
erated by PMUs—communicated to the operators in control
centers—can be used for a more accurate depiction of how
power system is behaving, and occasionally misbehaving.
A. Paper Contributions & Future Work
For ameliorated risk mitigation due to CAs in power net-
works, the focus of the research in this paper is on the unique,
seamless integration of three intertwined components:
• First, we utilize a robust dynamic state estimator for
perturbed grid dynamics. Then, estimates of the system’s
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UIs and possible CAs are obtained. These estimates are
then utilized for attack detection and isolation.
• Second, the state- and UI estimation components are
utilized in an optimization scheme to determine the most
faulty measurements with an attack detection filter.
• Finally, a risk mitigation strategy is employed to guaran-
tee a minimal threat-level, ensuring the observability of
the power system through available safe measurements.
Our future work in this area will focus on three main tasks:
• Deriving closed-form solutions for simultaneous UIs and
CAs estimates for a nonlinear power system model;
• Extending the dynamic risk mitigation problem by in-
corporating conventional devices and accounting for the
probabilistic threat-levels in PMU networks as in [28].
• Developing a computationally superior method for faster
dynamic state estimation for a power system, leveraging
the inherent sparsity of the power network.
B. What this Paper does not Address; Potential Solutions
While the methods investigated in this paper address the
interplay between DSE, unknown inputs reconstruction, and
cyber-attacks detection and mitigation, there are two main
challenges that are not addressed.
The first challenge is the DSE for a nonlinear representation
of the power system. In this paper, we use a linearized
representation for the power system as:
(a) Real-time state and UI estimates can be obtained in
real-time, whereas for a highly nonlinear power system,
these estimates require stricter assumptions and a stronger
computational capabilities that guarantee the convergence
of these estimates to their corresponding actual values;
(b) Under dynamic UIs and CAs, the problem of estimating
states for higher-order nonlinear power systems has never
been addressed before in the literature. The majority of
routines are based on Kalman filter derivatives, having
major difficulties under unknown inputs given nonlinear
systems. For the risk mitigation for nonlinear systems,
efficient computational solutions will have to be devel-
oped to ensure near real-time guarantees of the system’s
observability—this is a research question related to our
work in this paper, but is beyond this paper’s objectives.
The second challenge is the incorporation of dynamic loads.
We have assumed that the unknown inputs incorporate un-
known quantities such as model uncertainties, linearization
errors, and disturbances. We also illustrated that the derived es-
timator successfully estimates these unknown quantities with-
out prior knowledge on their distribution. However, variable
loads may not be immediately incorporated in the linearized
dynamic model, and if heavy loads are experienced during a
cyber-attack, the linear system model might become invalid.
To address these challenges, polytopic representations of
power systems can be derived that capture various linearized
representations corresponding to various loading conditions
(for different time-periods), whereby the SMO can be designed
given these conditions. Consequently, a unique observer gain
can be computed that stabilizes the estimation error norm
for all time-periods, considering variable loads and dynamic
unknown inputs. In particular, a common Lq can be solved for
different pairs of (A,Cp) matrices for different time-periods.
This idea is analogous to designing a common controller gain
for switched dynamical systems.
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